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High-quality early care and education (ECE) programs have been proven 
to create positive learning outcomes among children—especially 
among those living in poverty. Yet many low-income children have a 
hard time accessing quality child care settings and miss the critical 
developmental growth and foundation needed for academic and 
life success. According to Pennsylvania Partnerships for Children, 
only 23% of children who receive public child care subsidies attend 
a “high-quality” ECE program, as defined by the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania as quality designation “STAR 3” and “STAR 4.”
In 2013, NFF embarked on a multi-pronged study of 147 ECE providers 
to assess the financial challenges of operating high-quality ECE 
programs. In this report, NFF highlights the key financial, business, and 
systemic barriers to delivering high-quality programs—with a focus 
on nonprofit ECE programs serving the Philadelphia Region’s most 
vulnerable children.
Key Findings
ECE programs operate very close to the financial edge with 
little margin for error. Regardless of the quality of care and who is 
being served, providers operated very close to the break-even point 
(post-depreciation margin of 1%) and had limited cash reserves to 
weather the volatility of the ECE business model (year-end cash 
balances could cover only one month’s worth of operating expenses).
For many ECE operators, the decision to provide high-quality 
programs creates more financial and programmatic demands, 
without the promise of commensurate increases in financial 
revenue. ECE providers participating in Pennsylvania’s Quality Rating 
and Improvement System (“Keystone STARS”) achieved comparable 
financial metrics to those that did not participate. This finding 
highlights the absence of financial incentives for providers to pursue 
quality: There are few barriers to operating a child care business that 
meets minimal standards for health and safety and provides little 
educational content. In comparison, there are relatively significant 
barriers to operating a high-quality program that results in positive life 
outcomes for young children (e.g. greater costs for more credentialed, 
experienced teachers and substantial programmatic requirements and 
administrative compliance burdens associated with maintaining STARS 
designations).
There is little understanding of what the “full costs” are for 
providing high-quality care. NFF estimated an average cost of care 
of $11,832 per child per year—with the cost per child substantially 
greater for high-quality providers ($12,789 for STAR 3 and STAR 4 
as compared to $10,320 for STAR 1 and STAR 2). When factoring in 
essential costs beyond this “bare minimum” (such as investments in 
facilities, payments of debts, and contributions to reserves), these cost 
of care figures can increase substantially.
Existing ECE revenue sources do not allow high-quality 
programs (particularly those serving low-income children) to 
cover the relatively high fixed costs of care. Most sources of ECE 
revenue, including government subsidies for low-income children, are 
attached to a specific child (i.e., portable) and are variable depending 
on a provider’s changing enrollment and adherence to compliance 
requirements. Little funding is available directly for ECE providers (i.e., 
institutional). Without sufficient institutional funding, high-quality ECE 
programs struggle to cover the relatively high fixed costs of care. 
Available child care subsidies in Pennsylvania fall far short 
of covering the full cost of care. This gap increases as quality 
of care goes up. The primary public revenue source for low-income 
children (Child Care Information Services, or CCIS) does not cover a 
provider’s minimum cost of care per child and leaves a revenue gap 
of at least 23% for high-quality providers and 15% for lower-quality 
providers. 
Combining different types of funding to serve low-income 
children results in overly complex financial management 
practices. Some providers maximize revenue opportunities by 
“braiding” multiple revenue sources with child care subsidies. 
However, this strategy produces high financial management burdens 
and is unavailable for providers who serve low-income children who do 
not qualify for multiple subsidies.
Strict eligibility rules for child care subsidy result in 
disruptions in the continuity of care for low-income children, 
as well the continuity of revenue for the providers who serve 
them. There is a misalignment between the educational goals 
expected from high-quality programs and the limitations of the child 
care reimbursement model.
Executive Summary
This report sheds light on the financial, business and systemic realities affecting the supply of 
high-quality programs. How can the field address how the ECE system is currently capitalized 
(and under-capitalized)?
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Further research is needed to understand how parents 
select a child care provider. High-quality providers described 
difficulty in competing with lower-quality providers, which were 
often more affordable for poor working parents. In addition to cost, 
other key factors include convenience, socio-economic alignment 
with a provider, and parental awareness about quality ECE. Without 
understanding the motivations driving parent choices, some 
providers shared concern that expanding the supply of high-quality 
ECE will result in unused slots.
Recommendations 
Within the context of these challenges, NFF advises key 
recommendations for the primary decisionmakers that influence 
ECE delivery to Pennsylvania children: policymakers, funders, and 
ECE providers. 
 
Policymakers
There is a need to address the systemic mismatch between how 
capital currently flows into the ECE sector and the transformative 
educational outcomes that are expected from these dollars. We advise 
policymakers to explore the following approaches: 
• Bring current subsidy reimbursements to a level that better 
aligns with the actual cost of care and rate of inflation
• Reinforce subsidy eligibility policies that minimize disruptions 
to a child’s continuity of care
• Complement portable funding to the sector with more direct 
institutional funding options
• Align funding agencies around a shared set of goals that 
prioritizes educational outcomes
• Explore incentives that more directly encourage and support 
parents to select high-quality care
Funders
Given the priority of many states (including Pennsylvania) to expand 
high-quality ECE access for low-income children, it is essential 
that philanthropic funding streams help providers achieve and 
maintain high-quality standards and prepare providers for the major 
organizational change associated with growth or quality improvement. 
We recommend that funders focus on the following strategies:
• Provide the right kinds of capital to high-quality ECE programs 
serving low-income children (flexible general operating support 
and change capital for growing and changing programs that 
will incur deficits until the new financial model stabilizes)
• Help programs pursue growth wisely, prepare for the financial 
obstacles associated with growth, and plan/build the 
necessary reserves
• Assess the drivers of parental demand for high-quality 
programs in order to best inform the most appropriate 
intervention for increasing demand (e.g., restructuring 
incentives for subsidies)
Providers 
Given the public’s growing interest in high-quality ECE expansion, it is 
important now more than ever before for providers to employ sound 
financial planning and data-driven decision-making practices. We 
advise providers to consider the following practices: 
• Strengthen understanding of the core underlying economics of 
programs and the full cost of doing business so that providers 
can make well-informed decisions, adapt to changing financial 
dynamics, and clearly articulate their financial needs to 
funders, policymakers and other stakeholders
• Continue to seek opportunities for creative cost efficiencies, 
collaboration, and mentorship
• Proceed with growth activities with extreme caution and 
clarify the financial support that will be needed to address 
operating deficits that will occur en route to growth
Paradigm Shift Needed
Despite the existing financial and systemic obstacles, ECE providers 
continue the Herculean feat of delivering quality care to young 
children in Pennsylvania and across the country. This report begins to 
raise questions about how the current ECE system is capitalized (and 
under-capitalized) and sheds light on the inadequacies of the status 
quo to support the positive child outcomes expected from high-quality 
programs. Given the growing interest in expanding high-quality ECE 
across the country, a paradigm shift is needed now more than ever 
before to challenge the underlying ideologies and assumptions about 
ECE which directly influence the way in which the overarching system 
is funded and financed. 
It is our hope that in articulating these issues here that a data-driven 
and comprehensive dialogue between policymakers, funders, providers, 
and parents can occur to advance the ECE sector and enable more 
children to successfully access excellent care during the critical first 
2,000 days of life.
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A child’s path to either success or hardship is well-established 
within the first 2,000 days of life. It is within this critical window 
between infancy and age 5 that 90% of brain development and the 
formation of the brain’s essential infrastructure occur—setting the 
pathways for learning for a lifetime.1 During this narrow window of 
opportunity, a child’s day-to-day experiences and surroundings—
whether positive or negative—have a direct, powerful effect on 
the structural and functional development of the brain, including 
intelligence and personality. 
While parents are a child’s first and most important teachers, out-
of-home child care programs provide early care and education (ECE) 
for millions of young children in the U.S. every day and profoundly 
influence their development and readiness for school. Every week, 
nearly 11 million children in the U.S. under age 5 attend some type 
of child care setting during their parents’ work hours.2 This care can 
vary widely from care by relatives, individuals who care for children in 
their private homes (described as “family care”), and centers (such as 
preschool and early education programs). 
We also know that of the 20 million children under age 5 living in 
the U.S., over 4 million live in poverty.3 Research tells us that many 
of these children miss the developmental growth that is the critical 
foundation for success throughout life, tend to have less access to 
high-quality settings between infancy to age 5, and are at much greater 
risk for academic failure.4,5 High-quality ECE programs can be very 
effective in creating positive learning outcomes among children—and 
“at risk” children living in low-income communities in particular stand 
to benefit significantly.6 Yet they are least likely to actually access 
high-quality child care.7 The number of high-quality “seats” available 
to a community are often far outnumbered by the total number of 
children needing care. For example, a total of 1,890 state-certified 
ECE programs operate across the city of Philadelphia, yet only 177 of 
these programs are of “high quality” (as defined by Keystone STARS, 
Pennsylvania’s voluntary quality rating system).8 In total, high-quality 
programs provide 15,000 seats. This number pales in comparison to the 
100,000 Philadelphia children under the age of 5.9 Lastly, there is an 
economic argument for high-quality ECE. An analysis by the Pittsburgh 
Public Schools found that early childhood education eliminated the 
need for special education services in kindergarten for 42% of children 
(reflecting a cost savings of $570,000).10,11 
Through a ten-year initiative, Nonprofit Finance Fund (NFF) has had the 
opportunity to work with over 250 nonprofit child care centers in the 
five-county region of Southeastern Pennsylvania encompassing Bucks, 
Chester, Delaware, Montgomery and Philadelphia counties.12 Over that 
time and through a project funded by The William Penn Foundation, 
we have learned that a variety of financial models and systemic 
barriers stand in the way of providing high-quality care—especially 
for vulnerable children who need it the most. In this report, we share 
the key findings of this work and demystify the primary barriers—with 
the goal of providing funders and policymakers with tools to close the 
achievement gap that begins in infancy. 
To complement its 10-year history of working with nonprofit ECE centers, 
NFF conducted a financial analysis and qualitative inquiry about the 
financial model and systemic challenges associated with quality early 
learning and education programs. Our approach included:
• Financial analysis of audited financial data (varying time spans 
between 1999-2012) for 147 nonprofit child care centers, and 
most recently, publicly available tax information for 93 nonprofit 
child care centers*
The quality of care a child receives in the first five years of life are a critical predictor for life-
long success. Unfortunately, not all children have access to high-quality care. What are the 
barriers to access, and how can we solve them?
• Keystone STAR ratings for the cohort’s providers between 2002-2013
• Low-to-moderate income data self-reported by the cohort providers 
(LMI%)
• Qualitative interviews of 20 Philadelphia child care operators and 10 
leaders from the ECE community
• Literature review of sector research and studies
• Roundtable discussions convening 17 local child care operators and 
industry leaders.
*Note: Financial data was based on the population of nonprofit child care centers served by NFF’s previous Child Care Initiative, which provided capital, financial 
capacity-building and technical assistance to eligible nonprofit child care centers seeking to improve the quality of their programs and facilities. It is important to 
note that this initiative was intended to help centers achieve and maintain state certification, municipal requirements, and quality standards (Keystone STARS, 
NAEYC, NAA, etc.), expand program capacity, and/or address necessary maintenance. As such, financial analysis was based on a population of centers that was 
predisposed to quality improvements and met NFF’s financial due diligence criteria.13 
Methodology
The First 2,000 Days: Infancy to Age 5
Figure 1. This table reflects the number of state-certified child care providers operating in Southeastern Pennsylvania and throughout the state of Pennsylvania. Figures include all 
provider types: Centers (providing out-of-home care to 7 or more children aged 13 or under who are unrelated to the operator), Group providers (providing care for 7 – 12 children 
who are unrelated to the operator), and Family providers (operator providing care in their home for 4 – 6 children who are unrelated to the provider).
Total
Bucks County 125 58 46 35 32 296
Chester County 133 59 44 11 30 277
Delaware County 233 55 25 23 33 369
Montgomery County 201 58 76 67 49 451
Philadelphia 1,134 360 219 105 72 1,890
Southeastern PA 1,826 590 410 241 216 3,283
Pennsylvania State Total 4,291 1,468 1151 580 616 8,106
STAR 1 STAR 2 STAR 3 STAR 4non-STARS
The Landscape of Providers in Pennsylvania19
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In many states throughout the U.S., a child care program can be 
licensed to operate but only meet minimal standards for children’s 
health and safety without any meaningful educational content. In an 
effort to promote high-quality child care, Pennsylvania has established 
a voluntary Quality Rating Improvement System (QRIS) that offers 
financial support and other resources to help providers achieve higher 
standards in child care through improvements in educational content, 
staff accreditation, and administrative practices.
The characteristics of high-quality care have been widely studied by the 
field and defined as care that is “consistent, developmentally sound, 
and emotionally supportive” and goes well beyond minimum health and 
safety standards that are regulated by states.15 High-quality programs 
provide features that set the stage for higher quality adult-child 
interactions—a key predictor of childrens’ learning.16 These include:
• Smaller group sizes and fewer children per teacher to not only 
keep children safe but allow for more frequent and meaningful 
interactions between teachers and children.
• Higher credentialed teachers with the training, experience and 
capacity to understand and assess the developmental changes of 
young children and how to best support their learning.
Keystone STARS is Pennsylvania’s voluntary quality rating system, 
managed by the State Office of Child Development and Early 
Learning (OCDEL). Keystone STARS’ goals are “to improve, support, 
and recognize the continuous quality improvement efforts of early 
learning programs in Pennsylvania […] and to offer incentives and 
resources to help programs reach higher standards in areas such as 
staff credentials, curriculum, and management practices.” Providers 
earn STAR ratings from 1 to 4 (with 4 being highest) based on a 
number of factors including: small group size and low teacher-to-child 
ratios; developmentally and age-appropriate curricula; adequate 
teacher training and credentialing; parent-teacher communications; 
and safety of environment.
Pennsylvania defines high-quality programs as those with STAR 3 or 
STAR 4 ratings, that utilize evidence-based curricula and emphasize 
the development of children’s cognitive, social, emotional and 
physical skills. Such programs employ Bachelors’ or Masters’ level 
teachers trained in early childhood education (or related fields), 
conduct developmental screening, regularly communicate with 
parents, and emphasize kindergarten-readiness. As one provider 
describes: “Moving from STAR 2 to STAR 3 is when a provider moves 
from child care to education: you use a curriculum and credentialed 
teachers, you track your children [through] observation and 
assessment, and you report on outcomes.”17 
Over the past decade, Pennsylvania has made substantial progress 
toward meeting quality standards: participation in Keystone STARS 
program has increased since its inception in 2003, the state’s financial 
incentives for pursuing quality are among the most generous in the 
country for a QRIS, and today more than 27,000 Philadelphia children 
are enrolled in STARS programs. Despite this progress, however, most 
participating programs are clustered below STAR 3.18 
Studies show that high-quality education is the most effective intervention strategy to improve 
long-term outcomes for low-income children. But what is quality, and what does it look like?
Quality Rating Improvement System (QRIS): rating and assessment system to evaluate early childhood 
education programs for children ages five and under, provide incentives and support to improve quality, 
and communicate level of quality to the public by attaching a rating to the program.14
Understanding High-Quality Care
About the Graphs in This Report
In this and the following graphs, we show data sets across the following dimensions: 
Audited Financial Data: This represents median values of audited data from all 147 
providers in the cohort. Available data was for non-consecutive years, based on when 
a provider participated in NFF’s Child Care Initiative (1999-2012). Median values across 
years were also calculated. This data is shown because the detailed and uniform 
reporting allows for analysis of annual activities (e.g. surplus/deficit). The limitations of 
this data pertain to the lack of uniformity in timeframes from one provider to another.
990 Data: This represents median values of tax filings from 93 providers, a subset of the 
total cohort. Available data was for consecutive years (2008-2012). Median values across 
years were also calculated. This dimension of data is shown to give us a more consistent 
timeframe over which to analyze data.
Profitability: Also called operating margins or surplus, profitability indicates the extent 
to which providers can cover annual operating costs. Margins need to be large enough 
to cover year-over-year budgets, facility/equipment needs, and debt principal payments. 
For nonprofits with volatile financial models, which include most ECE providers, margins 
should also be large enough to contribute to savings, working capital, cash flow, and/or 
reserves to help navigate unexpected changes in operations.
• Surplus/Deficit as a % of Total Expenses indicates the operating margin 
relative to the provider’s overall budget size and is calculated by dividing the 
surplus or deficit (after depreciation) by total operating expenses for the same 
fiscal year. This metric is calculated as part of our analysis of audited financial 
statements.
• Change in Unrestricted Net Assets (URNA) as a % of Total Expenses is an 
analogous measure of profitability using IRS Form 990 data. This metric reflects the 
change in unrestricted net assets on the balance sheet.
Liquidity: This indicates to what extent providers are able to meet current expenses and 
obligations on existing cash levels. Distinct from year-over-year performance, liquidity 
illuminates how well capitalized an organization is. Is enough cash on hand to cover 
operating needs? And is the available cash restricted or ‘spoken for’? 
• Months of Cash indicates the number of months that a provider could operate on 
existing cash and is calculated by dividing the year-end cash balance by average 
monthly operating expenses.
The majority of providers had a substantial amount of fixed assets, such as buildings or 
equipment. Therefore, all graphs represent post-depreciation data, to reflect the annual 
wear and tear of facilities and equipment.
“We only hope to break even.”20 
-ECE provider 
0% 
(break-
even)
0.7%
1.2%
Profitability
Surplus/Deficit 
as a % of Annual 
Expense (audit)
% Change in 
Unrestricted Net 
Assets (990)
0 
months
1.4 1.3
Liquidity
Months of Cash 
(audit)
Months of Cash 
(990)
Figure 2. Providers in the cohort were operating very close to break-even, with just 
over 1 month of cash on hand. 
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ECE programs universally have a difficult time covering 
their expenses from year to year, and many have little cash 
reserves or “safety net” available to withstand volatility. 
This problem exists whether 
programs are higher quality 
or low, and whether they 
are serving children who are 
subsidized by the government 
or children whose parents pay 
full tuition. For any mission-
driven organization (whether 
for-profit or nonprofit), the 
absence of surpluses to build 
up cash reserves forces the 
organization to live paycheck-
to-paycheck and make 
decisions that are more short-
term and reactive in nature. 
For ECE providers, the quality 
of programs delivered to children can be compromised. 
NFF’s financial analysis of 147 providers of ECE indicated that 
providers operated very close to the break-even point (post-
Financial Barriers to Achieving High-Quality ECE
Our research suggests that most child care providers want to offer high-quality ECE. 
Nonetheless, the majority of providers participating in Pennsylvania’s QRIS are clustered below 
STAR 3. Why are more providers not achieving higher levels of quality?
ECE Finance: Walking a Tightrope With Little Safety Net
depreciation margin of 1% based on the median values for IRS 
Form 990 data; see figure 2). In addition, the median cash reserve 
size was equal to only 5 weeks of operating expenses—indicating 
that, at any given time, 
providers had only enough 
cash in the bank to pay for 
about one month’s worth of 
bills. Months of cash is one 
measure of liquidity, a key 
indicator for an organization’s 
ability to survive and thrive. 
Dynamics of the 
ECE financial 
model
Why do most ECE providers, 
regardless of their quality 
or who they serve, struggle 
to cover full costs? The 
difficulty in generating operating surpluses and cash reserves is 
rooted in the dynamics of the ECE financial model. NFF defines 
financial model in simple terms as “how an organization makes 
and spends its money in service of its mission.” It is composed 
10       © 2015, Nonprofit Finance Fund
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of revenue composition and expense composition. 
To assess a nonprofit’s overall financial health, NFF examines 
the predictability and reliability of revenue and the constancy 
(fixity) and flexibility of expenses. ECE operators manage the 
fundamental tension between balancing the relatively fixed cost 
of operations (with the majority of expenses related to skilled 
classroom teachers and facility needs) with revenues that vary 
depending on whether every enrollment slot is filled throughout 
the year and tuition is appropriately priced and collected from 
families and/or the government on time.
The operating challenges of the ECE model have been widely 
researched for the last several decades. Leading experts 
Louise Stoney and Anne Mitchell, co-founders of the Alliance 
for Early Childhood Finance, have emphasized in their 25 
years of research that there is no room for error in the ECE 
financial model: every dollar of revenue is needed to maintain 
the delivery of services to children. According to Stoney and 
Mitchell, an ECE program can only reach sustainability when it 
achieves a perfect trifecta of these following components:21
Achieving Full Enrollment 
Maximizing the revenue potential of each available enrollment 
slot is first priority for ECE providers. Funding is linked to the 
enrollment of each specific child—whether this revenue is 
from private-pay tuition paid by parents or subsidized funding 
paid by the government. While the number of students—and 
therefore, revenue—in a classroom may rise or fall, the biggest 
costs (such as teachers and space) are largely fixed. In order 
to fully cover costs, an ECE provider must achieve the virtually 
impossible ideal of at least 95% enrollment at all times.22 They 
must achieve this without over-enrolling, which would risk 
violating student-to-teacher ratio requirements.
Covering 100% of Costs with Tuition Fees 
Due to competition among providers and price sensitivity of 
private pay families, ECE providers often cannot set tuition rates 
high enough to cover the full cost of care. For providers serving 
low-income families, government subsidies cover only a portion 
of a child’s true cost of care. 
Collecting 100% of Tuition Fees 
The majority of revenue comes in the form of tuition attached to 
a particular child—either paid by families or, in the case of low-
income children, government subsidy. Subsidy payments are often 
contingent on rigorous compliance and paperwork. For private pay 
tuition, providers must stay on top of billing and collections. 
Average Annual Cost Per Child:
$11,832
(based on a total sample of 22 providers)
Figure 3. This data demonstrates the total average annual per-child cost to the 
provider. Data is based on a subset of 22 providers involved in ECE activities 
exclusively, and calculated by dividing the most recent annual total expenses 
(available via public IRS Form 990 data) by the most recent number of students 
enrolled. Despite small sample sizes between STAR categories above, the 
comparison of costs between STAR 1 – 2 and STAR 3 – 4 groups suggest rising 
costs with increasing quality investments.
Average Cost Per Child, By Level of Quality 
$11,375
Non- 
STARS
7 providers
$10,320
STAR 
1-2
5 providers
STAR 
3-4
$12,789
10 providers
Average
$11,832
22 providers
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For many ECE operators, the decision to pursue or 
provide high-quality programs creates more financial 
and programmatic demands, without the promise of 
commensurate increases in financial revenue. 
Costs of Providing High-Quality Care for 
Every Child
Currently, there is very little understanding of what the full 
costs are for providing high-quality care. In order to capture a 
high-level view, we looked at a subset of providers (22) that 
were ECE specialists who provided only ECE services and no 
others. We chose this subset 
because the costs incurred 
by these organizations could 
be assumed to be dedicated 
exclusively to the provision of 
ECE services for children. 
Based on enrollment figures 
and operating expenses among 
this subset, the average cost 
of care is estimated at $11,832 
per child per year (see Figure 
3.) When factoring in essential 
costs outside of the operating 
budget (such as investments 
in facilities, payment of debts, 
and contributions to reserves), 
NFF estimates that the full 
cost of care per child rises to 
$13,400. The cost per child 
rises significantly as quality 
level increases—particularly 
between STAR 2 to STAR 4. 
While it may seem obvious that high-quality programs cost 
more than low-quality programs, many providers expressed 
frustration that the financial impact of delivering high-quality 
remains largely misunderstood. Participants described the 
multitude of additional costs associated with higher quality 
programs—with the majority stemming from salary increases 
for more credentialed teachers, facility and environmental 
requirements, and the administrative and compliance activities 
associated with maintaining STARS designation. “The primary 
factor is teacher quality and certification,” shares one provider. 
“If you’re paying your teacher $8/hour, that’s the quality you 
will get. If you pay $16 - $17 per hour, which is still not a lot, 
you can achieve greater quality care in your program but it 
costs a provider a lot more money. That’s why so many centers 
do not pursue quality care, because they cannot afford quality 
teachers.”23 
Despite the costliness of employing credentialed teachers, it is 
worth noting the low compensation levels universal to the ECE 
industry: ECE staff who hold a four-year degree and work in a 
child care setting earn on average $24,000 a year, roughly half 
the salary of their public school counterparts. Only 25% of child 
care staff receives employer- funded health insurance and fewer 
still have retirement benefits.24 
Providers maintaining the 
highest level of quality also 
suffer from more growth in 
expenses over time. NFF’s 
analysis showed that providers 
committed to the highest level 
of quality (STAR 4) experienced 
the highest annual growth rate 
of expenses (3.7%) while non-
STARS programs experienced 
lower expense growth (1.7%).
On top of the requirements for 
achieving high-quality status, 
maintaining any STARS status 
at all can be difficult. Some 
participants noted that the 
difficulties of maintaining the 
costs of higher standards are 
disincentives for continuing 
with the program. For example, 
one provider described her 
experience of losing her STAR 2 designation when the program 
was unable to afford the costs of a “floater” teacher to help 
cover staff absences due to sickness and adhere to teacher-
to-child ratios.25 “The problem is not the cost to get into the 
STARS system; it’s the cost to stay there.”26 
Despite these challenges, many providers still make the 
commitment to high-quality. In many cases, the motivation is 
deeply personal and mission-driven. “We do quality because it’s 
the right thing for the kids,” says one participant.27 Unfortunately, 
the commitment to quality comes with financial risk.
Little Financial Reward for Quality for Most Providers
Non-STARS STARS vs.
0.8% 1.3% 0.5% 1.0%
0% 
(break-
even)
Profitability
1.5 1.1 1.3 1.4
Liquidity
0 
months
Non-STARS Providers vs. Providers in STARS
Figure 4. The median, post-depreciation surplus for both Non-STARS Providers and 
STARS Groups was equal to approximately 1.0% of total expenses, while cash 
reserve levels were equal to only 1.1 to 1.5 months of operations—both of which are 
comparable to median values for the total cohort. The majority (56% or 82) of NFF’s 
sample of 147 providers participate in some level of STARS. 
Surplus/Deficit 
as a % of Annual 
Expense (audit)
% Change in 
Unrestricted Net 
Assets (990)
Months of Cash 
(audit)
Months of Cash 
(990)
Providers By Level of Quality
Figure 5. In analyzing the total cohort, providers who make the decision to deliver higher quality care (as defined by STAR 3 and STAR 4 levels) are not 
necessarily in better financial positions relative to their peers—as indicated in the mixed, if not declining, profitability metrics and comparable cash reserves 
below (on average 1.5 months of operating expenses for providers at STAR 2, 3 and 4 levels).
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Financial Improvement is Not Correlated 
to Quality
In our first layer of analysis of the 147 providers in the cohort, 
NFF compared providers participating in the Keystone STARS 
program to those that were not participating. We asked: are 
there financial incentives or benefits to joining Pennsylvania’s 
QRIS? Although no data exist to identify the level of quality 
for non-STARS providers, participating in the STARS system 
signifies an organization’s commitment to high levels of quality. 
Our analysis revealed little difference between providers who 
participate in STARS versus providers who do not participate in 
STARS in two key financial metrics (profitability and liquidity) 
(see Figure 4).28 
In our second level of analysis, we asked if providers of 
higher levels of quality reported better financial health. The 
total sample of 147 suggests that there are no clear financial 
improvements for centers that aim to achieve higher levels of 
quality (See Figure 5.) In analyzing median indicators of the 
total cohort, providers who make the decision to deliver higher 
quality care (as defined by STAR 3 and STAR 4 levels) are not 
necessarily in better financial positions relative to their peers. 
Profitability and liquidity were mixed across levels of quality, 
and in some cases, profitability declined as quality increased.
Breakdown of ECE Providers by Type (Figure 6)
41+ 22 + 17 + 12 + 7 + 1
22% ECE Specialists
41% Multi-Service
12% School
17% Religious
7% YMCA/YWCA1% Hospital System
Total Cohort vs. ECE-Specialists (Figure 7)
non-STARS
STAR 1
STAR 2
STAR 3
STAR 4
ECE-Specialists (32 Providers)
43+ 18 + 14 + 12 + 13
44%
18%
14%
13%
12%
Total Cohort (147 Providers)
28+ 40 + 13 + 13 + 6
28%
41%
13%
13%
6%
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Organizations Specializing in ECE 
The cohort of 147 providers delivered ECE services in a 
variety of ways and through a variety of operating models.  
They included multi-service agencies, religious entities, and 
organizations exclusively dedicated to ECE activities (described 
here as “ECE specialists”).  In our third level of analysis, we 
asked if ECE specialists showed stronger correlations between 
financial health and quality level.  The vast majority of NFF’s 
sample was comprised of organizations delivering services 
beyond ECE. Comparing the overall cohort (which includes 
multi-service agencies) to providers specializing in a single 
service helps us better understand the impact of ECE business 
activities on financial health.
Our analysis showed that ECE specialists appeared to 
demonstrate modestly better operating margins, as compared to 
the overall cohort, while pursuing quality. However, the findings 
were less conclusive about the relationship between liquidity 
and quality; there was not a significant difference between the 
two groups.  
We further examined whether there was a correlation between 
financial health and quality level specifically for ECE specialists.  
Although STARS specialists fared better than non-STARS 
specialists in both profitability and liquidity (see figure 8), those 
at the lower-quality ratings STAR 1 and STAR 2 demonstrated 
the highest margins (see figure 9) while those at the higher 
ratings at STAR 3 and STAR 4 showed better liquidity.  Despite 
improved liquidity at the higher quality levels, the median 
value for the specialists group remained minimal at 1.7 months 
of cash—which is arguably an insufficient amount of cash 
reserves to remain adaptable in the volatile ECE market. 
Despite the modestly stronger operating margins of ECE 
specialists, there is not a consistent connection between quality 
and financial health. Regardless of program model (whether 
solely ECE, multi-service, or other), our analysis raises questions 
about whether there are clear business and financial incentives 
for providers to pursue higher designations of STAR 3 and 
STAR 4.  While outside of the scope of this project, it would be 
valuable to further investigate the factors driving this mixed 
story and analyze the financial cost vs. revenue associated with 
increasing STAR ratings.
Profitability: All Providers in Cohort vs. ECE Specialists, by Level of Quality 
Figure 9. This graph shows how ECE specialists of different levels of quality compared to the overall cohort, when it comes to profitability. The data indicate no significant correlation 
between quality and financial health. Overall, operating margins still remain very close to break-even for most groups. 990 data for both ECE specialists and the total cohort show 
relatively low profitability at STAR 1, improvement at STAR two, before weakening for STAR 3 and 4. The median 990 value for the total cohort shows post-depreciation deficit equal to 
3.4% of expenses. However, audited data suggests that ECE specialists at STAR 1 and 2 in particular have better financials when compared to the total group.
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Figure 8. 990 data shows that the median operating surplus (post-depreciation) 
is equal to 3.5% of expenses for STAR participants vs. 1.7% for Non-STARS 
groups. Although not shown here, it is important to note that, before considering 
depreciation, surpluses appeared significantly higher for STARS participants. 
The median operating surplus for STARS participants was 6.7% vs. 1.8% for 
Non-STARS providers. The difference between the pre- and post-depreciation 
results was thus greater for STARS organizations—implying greater fixed asset 
investments for them. 
On a liquidity basis, STARS-participating organizations had better cash reserve 
levels. However these levels were still at a minimal threshold of 1.6 months (as 
compared to one to three weeks of cash for Non-STARS groups).
Organizations Specializing in ECE 
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STARS Rating
Figure 10. This diagram helps us think 
about some of the main factors in the 
delivery of high-quality education to 
low-income populations. All providers 
can be plotted along the x-axis of Level 
of Quality (either Non-STARS or by STAR 
ratings) and the y-axis of % of Low-Income 
Children Served (%LMI). LMI refers to the 
percentage of low-to-moderate-income 
children served (self-reported by provider). 
Along Level of Quality, we have divided 
the cohort by Non-STARS, STARS 1-2 
(LOWER quality), and STARS 3-4 (HIGHER 
quality). Along %LMI, we have divided the 
cohort into below 50% LMI population 
served (LOW) and 50% and above LMI 
(HIGH).
While there is no clear pattern across 
quality, there is a divide when comparing 
low versus high LMI populations served. 
Providers serving 50% and above LMI 
populations struggled to maintain a 
surplus, only hitting 1.2% in the higher 
quality group and suffering deficits in the 
lower quality group. However, providers 
serving below 50% LMI populations had 
better profitability. This suggests that it is 
much harder to achieve profitability while 
serving a higher percentage of subsidized, 
rather than private pay clients. Private pay 
thus appears to go farther than subsidy to 
cover the cost of care.
The Financial Health of Providers Serving Low-Income Children
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The indisputable benefits of high-quality child care continue 
to rally public efforts to expand high-quality ECE programs in 
states like Pennsylvania, where only 23% of children enrolled 
in Pennsylvania’s subsidized child care program receive care at 
a high-quality STAR 3 or STAR 4 provider.30 Much of the focus 
of this public effort continues to place the onus on individual 
providers to achieve and maintain higher quality rankings (at 
the STAR 3 and STAR 4 levels). NFF’s analysis found a clear 
disparity in financial health occurring along the nexus of two 
dimensions: the degree to which a provider served low-income 
children and the provider’s quality designation (see Figure 10). 
Providers serving predominantly poor children faced greater 
financial challenges and had a harder time covering expenses (as 
compared to their counterparts serving predominantly private pay 
families). 31 
While it may seem intuitive that providers serving low-income 
children face greater financial challenges (as compared to those 
serving private pay populations), one key driver of this dynamic 
originates in the manner in which Pennsylvania administers child 
care funding. Before we explore the possible reasons for this 
disparity, it is important to first understand how this funding works. 
Barriers to Providing High-Quality Care 
for Low-Income Children
Providers who deliver high-quality programs for low-income children suffer more severe 
hardships than high-quality providers serving private pay clientele. What drives this dynamic? 
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Child Care Subsidies: How Does Child Care 
Work for Families Living in Poverty? 
Child care is expensive and can consume up to one-third of the 
median wages for a family of four.32 High-quality care is even 
more costly for parents of all economic groups—but it is especially 
unattainable for families living in poverty. In recognition of the 
benefits of high-quality child care, states such as Pennsylvania 
provide financial assistance for low-income families in order to 
“make quality child care more affordable, support the healthy 
development of children and help low-income parents access the 
child care they need to go to work or to school and support their 
families.”33 Low-income working parents are eligible for financial 
assistance to cover a majority of their child care expense. Financial 
assistance is provided in the form of subsidies or vouchers that 
follow the child to whichever provider parents select. 
Payments are made directly from the funding agency to the 
provider. In Southeastern Pennsylvania, Child Care Information 
Services (CCIS) is the primary source of funding for low-income 
families needing help to pay for child care. The primary intent of 
CCIS subsidy is to incentivize low-income families— as well as 
current and former TANF recipients— to work, by subsidizing the 
cost of child care. CCIS is funded by a combination of federal block 
grants and state funds.34 Currently, CCIS does not require parents 
to select quality programs in order to receive subsidies.
The CCIS subsidy is restricted to children 12 years of age or 
younger. In order to be eligible for the subsidy, families must:
1. Participate in an approved employment or education/training 
program(s), and; 
2. Show annual income levels that are 200% or less of the 
Federal Poverty Guidelines. As an example, this means that 
the total income for a family of four cannot exceed $47,700 
per year (as of 2014).35,36 
Parents must pay a co-pay, or portion of the tuition that is based 
on the family household income. Co-pays typically range from $10 
- $50 per week. However, despite the benefits of the subsidy, many 
eligible parents still struggle to meet co-pay requirements.37 
Understanding the challenges to managing government subsidies 
is a critical—and missing— ingredient for the sector to have a 
constructive dialogue about expanding the reach of high-quality 
ECE programs in any community. These challenges include 
insufficient reimbursement rates from state subsidies that do not 
cover the full cost of care, limited demand from parents for quality 
programs, and the misalignment between the goals of the state 
subsidy program and the educational goals of early childhood 
education—all of which directly threaten providers’ ability to 
survive in the long-term.
CCIS Eligibility: What Does 200% of the Federal Poverty Level Look Like?38 
Figure 11. This table shows a snapshot of the Federal poverty threshold for the 48 Contiguous States and the District of Columbia, as of 2014. Poverty guidelines are used to 
determine eligibility for various government services and conduct analyses on the state of financial prosperity in the US. We also show a calculation of 200% of the Poverty Level-- 
the amount that a family can make in order to be eligible for CCIS subsidy. 
Family of 2 Family of 3 Family of 4 Family of 5 Family of 6
Poverty Level  $ 15,730  $ 19,790  $ 23,850  $ 27,910  $ 31,970 
200% of Poverty Level  $ 31,460  $ 39,580  $ 47,700  $ 55,820  $ 63,940 
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Per Child (Pre-School Age) STAR 1 STAR 2 STAR 3 STAR 4
CCIS Base Reimbursement $8,489 $8,489 $8,489 $8,489
STARS Tiered Reimbursement $91 $247 $728 $1,300
Total Revenue $8,580 $8,736 $9,217 $9,789
Average Cost of Service Delivery $10,320 $10,320 $12,789 $12,789
Surplus (Deficit) $(1,740) $(1,584) $(3,572) $(3,000)
Surplus (Deficit) Per Classrom (20 children) $(34,800) $(31,680) $(71,440) $(60,000)
Lower Quality Higher Quality 
How Far Short do Subsidies Fall in Providing Services for  
Low-Income Children in Philadelphia County? 
Figure 12. This table demonstrates the economics of delivering quality ECE services to subsidy-eligible children. This example illustrates the revenue and expense dynamics associated 
with preschool age children in Philadelphia county. Revenue figures are based on the current CCIS base rate and STARS tiered reimbursement rates. While CCIS funding is available 
throughout a given year, the maximum revenue that can be earned through the CCIS subsidy is $8,489 per child per year based on a best case scenario that assumes 260 service days 
provided that a family maintains eligibility; with the maximum tiered reimbursement, total revenue increases to $9,789 at the STAR 4 level. As can be seen below, this revenue level does 
not cover the average cost of care. (Based on estimates for average cost of care and limited sample sizes shown in Figure 3.) 
“Our costs keep increasing each 
year while the base rate hasn’t 
even increased at the rate of 
inflation since 2007.”45—ECE 
Provider
Government Subsidies Do Not Cover the Full Cost of Care
CCIS provides a basic reimbursement for child care for eligible low-
income children. For example, in Philadelphia County, the base rate 
is no more than $32.65 per day for preschool age children in full-time 
care. (This base rate is commensurately reduced for children in 
part-time care.)39 The base rate applies to all providers regardless of 
whether or not they participate in STARS and quality investments.40 
(See Figure 12 for annual reimbursement figures.)
Historically, the gap between the cost 
of providing quality care and state 
reimbursement for children enrolled 
in CCIS has been substantial.41 Based 
on NFF’s estimated calculation of the 
average cost of care (approximately 
$12,000), the base revenue provided 
by CCIS does not allow a quality provider to fully cover the cost of 
operations per child (see Figure 12).
In recognition of the limitations of the base rate and parent co-pays, 
Keystone STARS was established to provide small grants and awards 
to support providers wishing to invest in quality improvements. This 
program was developed to address the substantial gap between 
the cost of care at the STAR 3 and STAR 4 levels and state CCIS 
reimbursement. In addition to the CCIS base reimbursement, 
providers pursuing quality ratings through Keystone STARS are also 
eligible to receive “Tiered Reimbursement” STARS Awards (increases 
in the per-child subsidy rate awarded to providers who meet high-
quality standards). Tiered reimbursements increase commensurately 
with level of quality. For example, a STAR 1 facility receives a CCIS 
subsidy of $0.35 per day for every eligible child in full-time care. 
Meanwhile, a STAR 4 facility receives $5.00 in subsidy for every 
eligible child in full-time care.42 
However, despite this progress, the benefits of this program still do 
not allow a STAR 3 or STAR 4 provider 
to fully cover the cost of care—even 
under a “best-case” scenario in which 
maximum allowable revenue figures 
are reflected.43 Based on anecdotal 
information shared during the interview 
process, this best case scenario is 
uncommon, due to the stringent child 
eligibility and attendance attached to the reimbursement process.
For many providers at the higher end of the STARS continuum, 
there is thus a misalignment between the educational goals and 
expectations around quality programs and the limitations of the 
reimbursement model. “Even though we receive the highest rate in 
our tiered reimbursement program, we receive just $3.65 an hour 
[per child] through CCIS funding. You can’t park a car in Philadelphia 
for $3.65 per hour,” according to one provider. “Yet there is an 
expectation that early childhood programs produce excellent 
outcomes. This is not possible without funding that mirrors high 
expectations.”44
18       © 2015, Nonprofit Finance Fund
®
 • nonprofitfinancefund.org
An organization’s ability to deliver on its mission and programs 
is highly dependent on its financial sustainability, the ability 
to pay for expenses in the short term and generate predictable 
and reliable revenue. To offset the deficiencies of the CCIS 
subsidy on both counts, ‘braiding’ is a critical strategy for 
providers to maintain financial stability while delivering high-
quality programs. Experts define braiding as coordinating two 
or more funding sources to support the total cost of services 
to individual children. However, this strategy often requires 
revenues and expenditures to be carefully tracked and allocated 
as required by various funding sources.52 
Louise Stoney and Anne Mitchell point out the mental 
gymnastics involved with tapping multiple revenue sources such 
as CCIS, Head Start, and other public sources: “Even in states 
[like Pennsylvania] that have ‘tiered’ child care subsidy rates 
“Braiding Revenue” Results in Highly Complex Financial Models 
“Children lose eligibility for all 
sorts of reasons.... But these 
things are completely outside 
of the provider’s control and in 
the end disrupt the continuity 
of care for the child and the 
[corresponding] subsidy revenue 
to the provider.”49—ECE Provider
CCIS Reimbursements Are Variable and Risky
One of the major financial obstacles to providing high-quality care 
to low-income children involves the relatively risky nature of CCIS 
revenue. The primary intent of CCIS subsidy is to incentivize low-
income families, as well as current and former TANF recipients, to 
work; as funds are directed through the Pennsylvania Department 
of Human Services, CCIS payments are thus contingent on the 
child’s actual attendance in the child care program in which s/
he is enrolled. This policy thus presumes that parents who are 
out of work can care for their children 
without the need for additional child 
care support. Based on this attendance 
reimbursement model, CCIS payments 
are made to providers on an 
incremental basis and are dependent 
on (1) the child’s adherence to strict 
attendance requirements, and (2) the 
family’s continued income eligibility 
and work status.46 
As a consequence of the system in 
which CCIS reimbursements are made, providers serving low-
income children face ongoing threats to the continuity of care 
and the corresponding revenue flow for any CCIS child. One staff 
member at CCIS Northwest illustrates this dynamic: “Children 
lose eligibility for all sorts of reasons—either because paperwork 
wasn’t submitted on time, or the parent loses eligibility because 
he lost his job or his training program was discontinued. But 
these things are completely outside of the provider’s control and 
in the end disrupt the continuity of care for the child and the 
[corresponding] subsidy revenue to the provider.”47 
When children are dropped from the CCIS system, it can take 
as long as 10 days for a family’s eligibility to be reinstated. 
One provider describes the lost revenue that can result from 
ineligibility or suspension issues: “Sometimes the child winds 
up coming back if it was just a matter of missed paperwork, but 
other times the child never gets readmitted into CCIS. But in the 
meantime, I am in limbo because I’m holding that slot [and] that’s 
a long period to lose revenue.” 48
Others argue that the variable nature of subsidies and tiered 
reimbursement revenue streams fail to acknowledge the educational 
goals and outcomes—and the required fixed cost investments 
(especially in teacher salaries and classrooms)—associated with 
higher quality programs. One provider 
shares: “In the subsidy world, your 
revenue fluctuates based on your 
enrollment and actual attendance of the 
child…when kids lose their eligibility, the 
revenue fluctuates and puts pressure on 
the financial model because you still have 
the same fixed costs …and that puts 
pressure on providers to make choices 
that compromise quality.”49 
Providers report common cost-cutting 
responses that ultimately lower program quality (e.g. sending 
teachers home early, holding back on purchasing necessary supplies 
and materials, and laying off administrative staff who often carry 
out key revenue-related activities such as staying on top of subsidy 
compliance requirements and responding to enrollment inquiries).50 
Overall, for many providers serving low-income children, the 
outcomes associated with high-quality programs cannot depend 
solely on the support from CCIS. As one provider explains, 
“Subsidized child care is not very viable [for educational 
outcomes]… There is a lack of consistent funding that leads 
to high turnover of teachers, instability of management and 
leadership […] and that is not quality [care].”51 
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“Far too many children are in 
poor quality settings, not because 
families chose such settings, but 
because quality is expensive.”59
—ECE Provider
Providers report low parental demand for quality—and therefore 
little incentive for providers to invest in quality programs. According 
to Pennsylvania Partnerships for Children, only 23% of the children 
receiving child care subsidies receive those services from a 
high-quality STAR 3 or 4 provider.56 Providers reported a variety of 
reasons that parental demand appears low. 
Knowledge Base: Providers observed that parents had limited 
understanding about Keystone STARS and quality ratings: “When I 
tell parents about our 4 stars, they think it’s a food rating [and don’t 
know] a high-quality environment means more than that we’ve filled 
out the paperwork correctly.”57 This is 
consistent with a 2014 study conducted 
by John Weiser, in which 66% of 41 
interviewed parents were not aware of 
Keystone STARS.58 
Price: For many parents living in 
poverty, the decision to choose a child 
care provider is based on economics. 
“Far too many children are in poor quality settings, not because 
families chose such settings but because quality is expensive,” 
shares one member of the cohort. In many cases, parents choose 
lower-quality, lower-cost options simply to survive.59
Maximizing Family Income: CCIS, along with its associated 
federal program TANF, allows parents to choose a family member 
as their child care provider, as long as that family member is 
registered with CCIS.60 The requirements for registration are 
Demand for High-Quality Care is Low
minimal and not contingent on quality of care.61 In many cases, 
parents have a financial incentive to choose a relative as a child 
care provider. One provider explains this dynamic: “The majority of 
parents who receive child care through TANF payments or subsidies 
choose…a sister, grandmother, aunt or someone in the family … 
With low-income families, they need that money. The reality is that 
high-quality child care providers are directly competing with low-
income families having direct resources to support their family.”62
Time and Convenience: Others observed that when choosing 
among child care options, parents—especially low-income 
parents working long hours—had little 
bandwidth to prioritize the benefits of 
quality care over convenience. 63
Personal Fit (Culture and Race): 
Some interviewees noted that racial 
and cultural alignment was a key driver 
in parents’ decisionmaking process. Yet 
these factors are often unrecognized. 64
Currently, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania does not require 
subsidy recipients to choose quality for their children. Some in the 
field argue that this eliminates a powerful incentive for the majority 
of the state’s child care providers who care for subsidized children 
to invest in well-credentialed staff and high-quality facilities. 
“The insufficiency of CCIS to 
cover the cost of care is the 
reason we do so many blended 
programs – to ensure sufficient 
financing… We’re paid by Head 
Start and CCIS and hoping that 
together they will be enough.”55
—ECE Provider
linked to the QRIS, programs at higher STAR levels typically 
need additional funding in order to break-even. And combining 
funds from multiple sources often requires careful accounting 
to avoid a challenge of ‘double-dipping.’”53 In braiding, cost 
allocation methods are required to assure that there is no 
duplicate funding of service costs 
and that each funding source is 
charged its fair share of program and 
administrative costs.54 
As a result of the need to braid, 
some high-quality providers in 
Philadelphia pursue Head Start 
revenue to complement the CCIS 
revenue stream. According to provider 
interviews delivering Head Start in 
partnership with the School District 
of Philadelphia, Head Start generally provides a “better funded 
slot” (when combined with CCIS subsidy) and serves as a more 
reliable and predictable revenue source (relative to CCIS). 
However, providers engaged in braiding Head Start with CCIS 
must manage the complexities of two sets of eligibility and 
requirements. 
Despite the complexities, providers 
describe braiding as one of the few 
strategies available to better fund 
quality care for lower-income children 
that need extended hours of care 
throughout the year.
Funders
Providers
Policymakers
Parents
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Moving Forward
How do we address the multitude of challenges standing in the way of providing high-quality 
care to low-income children? 
address their own needs and challenges while responding to the 
key financial, business and systemic barriers that obstruct high-
quality ECE access for children living in poverty. We offer these 
recommendations as a starting point 
to better equip the ECE field in the 
pursuit of greater access for children. 
Although this research did not 
include direct conversations with 
parents, it is important to note 
that parents’ voices are noticeably 
missing from this dialogue. We 
highlight for policymakers, funders, 
and providers the importance of 
better understanding the needs of 
parents—especially those of the 
working poor—in order to identify 
the best approaches to incentivizing 
greater parental demand for high-
quality programs. Providing parents 
with knowledge and information about 
the importance of quality ECE is just one component. More formal 
work and investigation is needed to address the myriad of factors 
that appear to affect parental demand for quality ECE (e.g., cost, 
convenience, personal and socio-economic alignment). 
The ECE system—like most systems—is made up of a delicate 
balance of both collective and competing interests among different 
stakeholders with unique needs and goals. The more aligned these 
interests are, the more successful the 
system. When perfect alignment is 
not possible (and it rarely is) success 
depends on the willingness and ability 
of all parties to participate in open 
dialogue and cooperation. 
There are four primary decisionmakers 
that influence the way in which ECE 
is delivered to children throughout 
Pennsylvania: policymakers, funders, 
providers and parents. Each of these 
stakeholders has a distinct set of 
goals and priorities that shape their 
decisionmaking processes, and each 
has a unique level of power and 
influence over the lives of children. At 
the center of these interests are the 
children themselves, whose life path is profoundly affected by the 
decisions surrounding this critical period between infancy and age 5.
In this final section of the report, we identify key 
recommendations for policymakers, funders, and providers to 
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Actions for Policymakers 
To Manage Right Now 
Increase the base subsidy rate
CCIS’s base subsidy rate falls far short of covering full costs. This 
problem is compounded by the fact that the base subsidy rate 
has failed to keep up with the rate of inflation since 2007 (and, in 
fact, is lower today than 2007 levels).65 In addition to re-setting 
the base to a rate that better aligns with the actual costs of 
care, it is important to implement a year-over-year policy that 
allows the base subsidy rate to annually increase with the rate 
of inflation. 
Increase tiered reimbursement rates to match costs
While tiered reimbursements in Pennsylvania are among the most 
generous in the country, they rarely enable high-quality providers 
to fully cover the cost of care. Additionally, the costs associated 
with each level of quality are not properly incorporated into the 
current reimbursement model. In order to adequately support 
providers seeking to achieve high-quality standards, tiered 
reimbursements must thoroughly align with the costs associated 
with each STAR level. 
Implement eligibility policies that are more friendly to 
parents and providers
A child’s family can lose eligibility for subsidy at any time—either 
due to changes in parents’ work status or a child’s missed days 
of school. For the family, strict eligibility requirements disrupt 
a child’s continuity of care and do not serve the interests of 
the child. For the ECE provider, the interruption in CCIS subsidy 
contributes to the organization’s financial volatility, keeping 
them at the edge of break-even as they juggle complex subsidy 
dynamics. Policymakers need to consider the impact of current 
eligibility requirements on children, parents, and providers and 
alternative policies that would better support the continuity 
of care for the child. The recent passage of the Child Care and 
Development Block Grant (CCDBG) Act of 2014 indicates an 
important first step in affording greater stability to parents, 
children and providers by establishing a 12-month eligibility 
re-determination period (i.e., families remain eligible during a 
12-month period, regardless of changes in income or temporary 
changes in work status).66
To Support Long-Term Adaptability
Complement portable funding with direct institutional 
funding options
Most ECE revenue streams (whether out-of-pocket tuition or 
public subsidies) are portable and follow a specific child. In 
the case of subsidies, portable revenues belong to an eligible 
individual who may take that funding to an eligible institution of 
his/her choosing. While portable funding affords parents with 
much needed flexibility to cope with life changes and realities, 
this kind of revenue stream presents challenges for ECE providers. 
ECE directors must direct a significant level of attention and 
energies toward keeping each slot enrolled while also ensuring 
educational outcomes. When a child leaves an ECE program, 
the associated funding disappears from a provider’s revenue 
stream—often creating financial volatility and risk to both the 
center and the children served within its walls. In comparison, an 
elementary school model often benefits from institutional funding 
in which a direct subsidy is provided for the delivery of services to 
eligible children. 
In order to begin addressing the long-term financial viability of 
ECE providers tasked increasingly with educational outcomes, the 
sector requires more options for direct institutional subsidies to 
counterbalance the effects of portable funding. Bringing together 
these two types of funding into better proportion can take into 
consideration the needs of the parent and provider.
Align government agencies with shared goals for 
educational outcomes
The ECE public funding infrastructure encompasses a myriad of 
agencies with conflicting goals. For example, one conflict occurs 
between CCIS and Pennsylvania’s Office of Child Development and 
Early Learning (OCDEL). CCIS’s primary goal is to enable low-income 
parents to maintain employment, and as a result CCIS funding is 
contingent on the work status and income eligibility of parents. 
Children can thus be removed from high-quality care based on 
the work status of their parents, which disrupts the educational 
outcomes and continuity of care goals of OCDEL. Providers are thus 
challenged to manage the disparate regulations and requirements 
for each funding source. A shared set of goals between agencies 
will lead to streamlined compliance and reimbursement processes 
for providers while allowing funding to work in unison (rather than 
in conflict) in support of the child.
Explore incentives encouraging parents to choose high- 
quality care
As mentioned, the majority of high-quality providers interviewed 
struggle to achieve full enrollment. Our conversations with 
providers suggest that parents do not always prioritize high-
quality care when selecting a child care provider. Policy options 
to increase consumer demand for high quality care may include 
restricting use of CCIS subsidies toward quality providers, 
providing a weighted financial incentive depending on the quality 
level of selected providers, more explicit recommendations 
provided to parents by Keystone STARS, and broader marketing 
and public education campaigns for parents. 
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Actions for Funders 
To Support Providers Right Now
Provide flexible support
While awaiting systemic reform of the larger subsidy system, 
philanthropic investors can best support providers who are already 
delivering strong programs to the most vulnerable children by 
providing general operating support. This kind of flexible funding 
would allow providers who have already achieved and maintained 
high-quality status to address their structural operating deficits, 
focus on delivering quality care, and plan for the long term. 
Organizations need this type of flexible support on an ongoing 
basis—over many years—in order to reap its benefits.
For growing or changing programs, provide change capital
During periods of growth or change, most organizations incur 
deficits until their new financial model sets in. Unfortunately, they 
often struggle to raise the financial resources they truly need to 
achieve resounding success. Funders must understand the change 
capital requirements for those pursuing quality improvements 
and/or expansion. Change capital support can help organizations 
achieve major financial model changes, such as programmatic 
expansion, or invest in improvements in quality. It is important to 
note that most significant growth or change projects result in a 
long-term operating gap. Expansion should not just be funded as 
a one-time event; rather, funders must understand how long an 
organization expects the deficit to last and what it will truly take 
to emerge from growth as a more sustainable high-performing 
organization. 
To Support Long-Term Adaptability
Help providers build necessary reserves
Quality improvement and expansion are both major change 
processes that cannot happen overnight. Funders can partner with 
providers to plan and build reserves that can best equip them to 
meet their long-term goals over a much more carefully planned 
period. In addition, funders can also help providers address day-
to-day problems by helping them build working capital reserves 
and risk reserves to plan for the inherent volatility of their financial 
model.
Better understand parental choice
As of 2015, Pennsylvania’s public dialogue is centered around 
expanding the number of slots for low-income children in high-
quality centers. However, there are some who argue that the 
existing supply of high-quality seats is currently underutilized in 
some communities. Many high-quality providers interviewed for this 
report described recurring difficulty achieving full enrollment. With 
broader efforts underway to increase the supply of high-quality 
child care in Pennsylvania, there is concern among some providers 
about the potential for underutilized high-quality slots. 
The field still lacks sufficient examination into the key factors 
surrounding parental demand for quality care. Before moving 
forward with expansion, subsequent research should investigate 
the decision factors that determine consumers’ choice of child care 
providers and other potential barriers. This investigation would then 
inform the most appropriate intervention for increasing parental 
demand for high-quality child care and how to best restructure 
subsidy incentives.
Approach expansion with extreme caution
Similar to providers, funders must beware the impact that 
expansion can have on an organization’s financial health. An ECE 
provider is only ready for growth when it has a strong financial 
roadmap for sustainability and sufficient resources to manage 
deficits during period(s) of growth or change, among many other 
factors. Funders can help organizations pursue growth wisely, while 
also being a voice of caution when all of the ingredients for growth 
or change are not in place.
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Actions for Providers 
To Manage Right Now
Clarify core financial dynamics
In order to make well-informed decisions and adapt to changing 
financial dynamics, providers who are proficient in understanding the 
economic drivers of their programs are better able to make well-
informed decisions that address both mission and financial needs. 
For example, one Philadelphia provider learned that for every new 
subsidized child served, her program would need to fundraise or 
identify an additional $4,000 to cover the gap between subsidy revenue 
and expense to serve that child.
Budget conservatively
Providers who most effectively juggle the challenging revenue 
and expense dynamics of the ECE model are those who adhere to 
conservative budgeting practices, in which programs build in some 
margin for error by underestimating revenues, overestimating expenses, 
and aiming for beyond-break-even results. A conservative approach to 
the budgeting process can help soften the blow of unforeseen revenue 
losses or unplanned cost increases—both of which could otherwise 
threaten the continuity of services for children.
Plan ahead for cash hardships: monthly cash flow
The timing and reliability of payments—whether paid out of pocket by 
families or by government subsidies—drive a provider’s ability to keep 
the lights on and doors open. Projecting month-to-month cash inflows 
and outflows can help identify the most cash constrained times of the 
year and a corresponding plan of response, such as tapping a line of 
credit or depleting any existing cash reserves.
Seek opportunities for cost efficiencies
In the ECE model, there are few opportunities for cutting expenses 
associated with delivering quality services. Yet, some providers 
reported creative strategies for realizing cost efficiencies for program 
and business needs. Some examples include: sharing the costs of back-
office administrative infrastructure (such as financial or fundraising 
staff) across multiple programs or sites, and forming collaborative 
alliances in which participating providers share access to teacher 
training and mentorship opportunities (both of which are critical for 
quality programs).
Lean on mentors to better navigate the quality process
In the Philadelphia ECE community (as in other parts of the country), 
high-performing and experienced providers take it upon themselves 
to mentor and coach those who are newly entering the quality 
improvement process. Some providers reported the value of mentorship 
(whether on a formal or informal basis) in helping new agencies 
navigate the quality system while managing the operational and 
financial realities of the ECE model. 
To Achieve Long-Term Adaptability
 Understand the full cost of doing business
At present, public funding sources available to ECE providers rarely 
cover the full cost of offering high-quality care to low-income 
families in Philadelphia. However, among the financial complexities 
of juggling subsidies, many providers often struggle to understand 
what the full costs of doing business actually are. These include 
not only regular operating expenses, but also facility maintenance 
costs, replacement of equipment and systems, principal debt 
payments, and savings for the future. While no easy task, 
understanding the true picture of full costs can not only help inform 
financial decisions; it can help give funders and policymakers 
the information they need when they shape decisions that affect 
providers.
Consider growth with extreme caution
Providers need to beware of the myth that programmatic growth 
will lead to financial sustainability. Providers that expand may 
be faced with a widening gap between subsidy and the true cost 
of operations and require additional support (via fundraising or 
additional fundraising activities) to address structural operating 
deficits that often go hand-in-hand with growth. 
Build designated reserves for higher quality 
Many providers struggle to break-even and, as a result, often 
have a difficult time building cash reserves. Yet, the process for 
achieving and maintaining quality necessitates additional cash to 
help a program make the transition when it is ready (e.g., hiring 
teachers with higher credentials, making facility improvements, and 
upgrading environmental standards). Setting aside reserves to plan 
for these costs over time can help a program make the transition 
when it is ready.
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Today, the evidence supporting the role of high-quality ECE for 
a child’s lifelong success is indisputable. Increasingly, research 
further demonstrates the direct linkage between the positive child 
outcomes gained from high-quality ECE and a region’s economic 
strength (including a stronger workforce and cost savings achieved 
from public programs). There is also substantial evidence that 
vulnerable children who live in poverty stand to benefit the most 
from high-quality ECE settings.
Despite this evidence, low-income children continue to have 
the greatest challenges accessing high-quality programs, and 
high-quality providers continue to remain under-capitalized. Even 
under the best circumstances, high-quality ECE providers struggle 
to break-even and often operate with little safety net—leaving 
providers with very little margin for error to absorb the volatility 
of the underlying economic model. In the case of programs that 
serve low-income children, public subsidies fall short of covering 
the cost of quality care (leaving a revenue gap of at least 23% for 
high-quality programs). In addition to the insufficiency of subsidy 
levels, there is also a mismatch between reimbursement policies 
and the long-term educational goals and outcomes expected from 
high-quality programs. 
This report begins to shed light on the financial, business and 
systemic realities affecting the supply of high-quality programs, 
and raises key questions about how the ECE system is currently 
capitalized (and under-capitalized). If the evidence to support 
high-quality care is so compelling, what are the underlying causes 
behind chronic under-capitalization? Based on our research, we 
believe that the existing characteristics of capital in the ECE system 
reflect a set of inherent beliefs and flawed myths about the care of 
young children in the U.S. 
Myth #1: ECE is just about babysitting. 
One longstanding myth assumes that caring for young children 
is merely a matter of providing basic custodial care, without the 
need for skilled labor and appropriately compensated staff. The 
consequence of this ideology results in an expectation of low costs 
of care and pressure for ECE providers to operate on very tight 
margins and not compromise on quality. 
Myth #2: Although K-12 education is a public 
good, child care is the parents’ responsibility.
Because ECE is not consistently valued as a public good—despite 
evidence pointing to its role improving economic and social 
outcomes that reverberate well beyond a single child—child 
care subsidies are often tied to the working circumstances of 
parents. As a result, children bear the consequences of their 
parents’ circumstances. Eventually, society as a whole bears the 
consequences as well. 
Myth #3: ECE is not a form of education.
ECE is not treated as a part of the formal education continuum, 
despite the growing body of evidence that links high-quality ECE to 
kindergarten readiness and grade 3 literacy. As a result, its funding 
sources are not as balanced between portable and institutional types 
of funding in comparison to primary, secondary, and higher education.
These historic misconceptions continue to directly shape today’s 
realities in the levels and nature of capital in the ECE system. 
These influences are most reflected in the lion’s share of ECE 
revenues remaining largely variable and portable, and the scarcity 
of institutional dollars for ECE; the lack of formal structure that both 
addresses the needs of working parents and incentivizes parent 
choice toward high-quality; and the stark disparity in ECE workforce 
compensation as compared to K-12 counterparts.
While some pursue widespread reform, ECE providers continue the 
Herculean feat of delivering excellent education and care to young 
children in Pennsylvania and across the country. However, in order 
for high-quality ECE to maximize positive impact on children who 
need it the most, there needs to be a paradigm shift that challenges 
prevailing ideologies and assumptions about ECE and begins to 
ask the question: how can the ECE system be better supported, 
financed and funded in order to provide high-quality programs to 
children who need them the most? It is our hope that in articulating 
these issues here that a data-driven and comprehensive dialogue 
between policymakers, funders, providers, and parents can occur to 
strengthen the ECE sector and enable more children to successfully 
access excellent care during the critical first 2,000 days of life.
A Paradigm Shift is Needed in ECE
How does ideology affect the way we support ECE organizations and the children they serve? 
And what will it take to align policy and funding with the society we envision?  
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